The victims of Europe and the Holocaust decided that they want a state of their own, somewhere, anywhere in the world.
After considering many options (at the expense and with total disregard to whoever may have already lived in the selected lands), Palestine was chosen. Among the Jewish Zionist options were such countries as Argentina, Ghana and other countries.
The Zionist movement arose in late nineteenth-century Europe, influenced by the nationalist ferment sweeping that continent. Zionism acquired its particular focus from the “ancient Jewish longing” for the return to Zion and received a strong impetus from the increasingly intolerable conditions facing the large Jewish community in Tsarist Russia. The movement also developed at the time of major European territorial acquisitions in Asia and Africa, and benefited from the European powers’ competition for influence in the shrinking Ottoman Empire.
One result of this involvement with European expansionism, however, was that the leaders of the nascent nationalist movements in the Middle East viewed Zionism as an adjunct of European colonialism. Moreover, Zionist assertions of the contemporary relevance of the Jews’ historical ties to Palestine, coupled with their land purchases and immigration, alarmed the indigenous population of the Ottoman districts that comprised Palestine. The Jewish community (yishuv) rose from 6 percent of Palestine’s population in 1880 to 10 percent by 1914. Although the numbers were insignificant, the settlers were outspoken enough to arouse the opposition of Arab leaders and induce them to exert counter pressure on the Ottoman regime to prohibit Jewish immigration and land buying.
As early as 1891, a group of Muslim and Christian notables cabled Istanbul, urging the government to prohibit Jewish immigration and land purchase. The resulting edicts radically curtailed land purchases in the Sanjak (district) of JERUSALEM for the next decade. When a Zionist Congress resolution in 1905 called for increased colonization, the Ottoman regime suspended all land transfers to Jews in both the Sanjak of Jerusalem and the Wilayat (province) of Beirut.
After the coup d’etat by the Young Turks in 1908, the Palestinians used their representation in the central parliament and their access to newly opened local newspapers to press their claims and express their concerns. They were particularly vociferous in opposition to discussions that took place between the financially hard-pressed Ottoman regime and Zionist leaders in 1912-13, which would have let the world Zionist Organization purchase crown land (Jiftlik) in the Baysan Valley, along the Jordan River.
The Zionists did not try to quell Palestinian fears, since their concern was to encourage colonization from Europe and to minimize the obstacles in their path. The only effort to meet to discuss Palestinian and Zionist aspirations occurred in the spring of 1914. Its difficulties illustrated the incompatibility in the aims of both sides aspirations. The Palestinians wanted the Zionists to present them with a document that would state
- Zionists precise political ambitions,
- Zionists willingness to open their schools to Palestinians, and
- Zionists intentions of learning Arabic and integrating with the local population.
The Zionists rejected this proposal.
The proclamation of the BALFOUR DECLARATION on November 2, 1917, and the arrival of British troops in Palestine soon after, transformed the political situation. The declaration gave the Zionist movement its long-sought legal status. The qualification that: nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine seemed a relatively insignificant obstacle to the Zionists, especially since it referred only to those communities’: civil and religious rights, not to political or national rights. The subsequent British occupation gave Britain the ability to carry out that pledge and provide the protection necessary for the Zionists to realize their aims.
Chaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organization, placed maximalist demands before the Paris Peace Conference in February 1919. He stated that he expected 70,000 to 80,000 Jewish immigrants to arrive each year in Palestine. When they became the majority, they would form an independent government and Palestine and would become: “as Jewish as England is English”
Weizmann proposed that the boundaries should be the Mediterranean Sea on the west; Sidon, the Litani River, and Mount Hermon on the north; all of Transjordan west of the Hijaz railway on the east; and a line across Sinai from Aqaba to al-Arish on the south. He argued that:
“the boundaries above outlined are what we consider essential for the economic foundation of the country. Palestine must have its natural outlet to the sea and control of its rivers and their headwaters. The boundaries are sketched with the general economic needs and historic traditions of the country in mind.”
Quite an expansionist dream for a Russian Jew!
The irony is that
all most Jews living in Israel today are Europeans. Those born in Palestine since 1948 cannot claim the land as theirs. They are Palestinians but of Jewish faith. Does the fact that, say, American Muslims who were born and raised in the USA, have any right to claim America as a “Muslim State?”
The map above (Palestine 1946), published as a United Nation Map number 93 (b) in 1950, clearly proves – when compared to present-day Israelis maps, that the Nazi-like Zionist simply occupied, terrorized and continue to ethnic cleanse the land of Palestine.
The seven well equipped Arab armies who attempted to destroy the poorly armed and newly founded ‘Jewish State’!
he baseless myth, of how the Arab armies wanted to destroy the ‘Jewish State’, has been propagated in all sectors of the Israeli society, especially in its school system, military boot camps, and media. As it will be proven below, this myth was deemed necessary by most Zionists to legitimize their continued USURPATION of the Palestinian people’s political, civil, and economic rights.
Often when Israelis and Zionists are confronted with facts contrary to their liking, they counter by accusing the sources of fabrication or being part of the “anti-Semitic” Arab propaganda. To avoid such a “confusion”, we’ll directly quote two of the most prominent pro-Israeli historians, Martin Van Creveld (the renowned Israeli military strategist and historian) and Martin Gilbert, who wrote:
- “In the Event of invading [Arab] forces were limited to approximately 30,000 men. The strongest [consider this fact while reading the next quote] single contingent was the Jordanian one, already described. Next came Egyptians with 5,500 men, then the Iraqis with 4,500 who ….. were joined by perhaps 3,000 local irregulars. The total was thus around eight rather under strength brigades, some of them definitely of second-and even third-rate quality. To these must be added approximately 2,000 Lebanese (one brigade) and 6,000 Syrians (three brigades). Thus, even though the Arab countries [population] outnumbered the Yishuv by better then forty-to-one, in terms of military manpower available for combat in Palestine the two sides were fairly evenly matched. As time went on and both sides sent reinforcements the balance changed in the Jews’ favor; by October they had almost 90,000 men and women under arms, the Arabs only 68,000.” (The Sword And The Olive, p. 77-78)
- “Senior Hagana commanders met with committee [UN Special Committee On Palestine-UNSCOP] members in Jerusalem’s Talpiot quarter in similarly surreptitious circumstances to express confidence that Jewish forces, which they numbered at 90,000, including 35,000 reservists, could overcome any Arab assault should it come to war.” (Jerusalem Post)
- “Ben-Gurion made serious efforts, shortly before the United Nations vote on the Partition proposal, to seek the neutrality of King Abdullah of Transjordan, whose British trained and officered army, the Arab Legion, was the STRONGEST fighting force in the Middle East. The king had long been at loggerheads with Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, for the moral leadership of the Arabs of the whole region. Abdullah’s secret interlocutor was to be Golda Meir:”‘ …… He [King Abudullah] soon made the heart of the matter clear: he would not join in any Arab attack on us. He would always remain our friend, he said, and like us, he wanted peace more than anything else. After all, we had a common foe, the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini.'”(Israel: A History, p.149-150)
- “As for Abdullah’s Arab Legion, it had fought better than any other Arab force. Yet on scarcely any occasion had the Arab Legion attempted to conquer territories allotted to the Jews by the partition plan, preferring to stay on the defensive.” (The Sword And The Olive, p. 95)
- “…. there was no common military headquarters, no attempts at coordinating the offenses of the Arab armies, and … not even a regular liaison service for sharing enemy intelligence.” (The Sword And The Olive, p. 83)
- “Perhaps the most important [of the Arab armies problems] was a crippled shortage of ammunition, owing to the international arms embargo …, in the case of the Iraqis and Egyptians, long lines of communications. For example, after February 25, 1948, the Arab Legion received no new ammunition for its 20mm guns. Some of the ammunition used by the Iraqi artillery was more than thirty years old; the Syrians had no ammunition for their heavy 155mm guns. Whereas Jewish stockpiles were growing all the times [especially the big arms shipment from Czechoslovakia in May 1948], the enemies were so depleted they stole ammunition shipments for each other. In addition, they were ill-coordinated, technically incompetent, slow, ponderous, badly led, and unable to cope with night operations that willy-nilly, constituted the IDF’s expertise.” (The Sword And The Olive, p. 95-96)
- Soon after the execution of Operation Dani in the first half of July 1948, Yigal Allon wrote a Palmach (Haganah’s strike force) report stating that the expulsion of Lydda‘s and Ramla‘s inhabitants had:
“clogged the routes of the advance of the [Transjordan Arab] Legion and had foisted upon the Arab economy the problem of “maintaining another 45,000 souls . . . Moreover, the phenomenon of the flight of tens of thousands will no doubt cause demoralization in every Arab area [the refugees] reach . . . This victory will yet have great effect on other sectors.” (Israel: A History, p. 218 & Benny Morris, p. 211)
Although we disagree with the Arab armies’ statistics (30,000 men) that was presented by Mr. Creveld, the reader could conclude the following:
- The strongest Arab army to enter Palestine was in cahoots with the Israelis from the start. Based on H.M. King Abdullah‘s orders (who also commanded the Iraqi Army in addition to Transjordan’s), the strongest Arab armies did not even encroach on the areas allotted to the Jewish state by the 1947 UN GA Partition plan. On the contrary, the truth was the exact opposite, for example:
1- Lydda, Ramla, and the Triangle Areas were handed over to the Israelis without a fight. Although Transjordan’s Army withdrew based on the orders of H.M. the King, the Iraqi Army (which was positioned few kilometers north in Ras al-‘Ayn) was given explicit orders not to intervene (their motto in Arabic was: maku ‘Awamer). It should be noted that these areas used to be densely populated with Palestinians, were fertile, and were strategically located for both Arab and Israeli supply lines.
2- When the Israeli Army attacked the Egyptian (south) and Syrian (northeast) armies in mid-October, 1948, the Iraqi and Jordanian armies were forbidden from opening a third front in the middle and south. The Iraqi Army was capable of splitting Israel in half if it was given the orders, and the Jordanian Army watched from the sidelines as the Israeli Army mauled the Egyptians in southern Hebron and Beersheba areas (Righteous Victims, p. 244). Note that the Iraqi Army was well positioned in the Tulkarm-Jinin areas (southeast of Haifa) which is only 12-14 kilometers from the Mediterranean, click here for a map illustration.
- The other strongest Arab armies, Egyptian and Iraqi, had long supply and communication lines away from their bases in their respective countries.
- Saudi Arabian and Sudanese armies contributed few thousand soldiers in the middle of the war to shore up the exhausted Egyptian army in southern Palestine.
- Under American and French pressure, the Lebanese Army was sidelined from the start, and it did not even cross the international borders. At the most, the Lebanese army provided a mediocre artillery cover to some ALA [Arab Liberation Army] volunteers at the beginning of the war. (Righteous Victims p. 233-234)
- When the Arab armies entered Palestine on May 15, 1948, close to 400,000 Palestinian refugees were already ethnically cleansed out of their homes, and they clogged the roads, burdened local economies, and demoralized the Arab populations and armies, as it was admitted by Yigal Allon. In other words, the Palestinian refugees were used as a weapon against Israel’s enemies.
- The Arab armies neither coordinated their military operational plans, nor shared military intelligence among themselves. In fact, it wasn’t until April 30, 1948 that the Arab armies’ chiefs of staff met for the first time to work out a plan for military intervention. It’s worth noting that this plan was later wrecked by H.M. King Abdullah, when he made last minute changes just before the entry of any Arab army into British Mandated Palestine. (Simha Flapan, p. 133 & Iron Wall, p. 35)
- According to a Jewish Agency assessment of the Arab intentions and capacities, submitted in March 1948, reported that the Arabs chiefs of staff had warned their government against an invasion of Palestine and any lengthy war because of the internal situation in most of the Arab countries. For example, revolt in Yemen kept the Saudis at bay and there was a mass riot in Iraq against the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, (Simha Flapan, p. 123-124)
- Yochai Sela of Tel-Aviv University, has provided the following breakdown for the number of Israelis killed during the 1948 war:
|Fatality Category||Value||Percentage of Total|
|Soldiers killed between
Nov. 30, 1947 – May 15, 1948
|Soldiers killed between
May 15, 1948- March 10, 1949
|Killed within the
areas designated by the UN
|Killed outside the
areas designated by the UN
Source: Simha Flapan, p. 198-199.
* Majority died in Jerusalem
** The number of Israelis killed while fighting the Arab Legion 1,367; the Palestinians, 1,092; the Egyptians, 910; the Syrians, 238; the Iraqis, 241; the Lebanese 129; Qawukji’ ALA, 336, the British 30.
*** Mostly soldiers, non-civilians.
- These statistics clearly show that the number of Israeli soldiers killed in offensive actions were well over 60% (2,759/4,558) of the total Israeli soldiers killed between November 30, 1947 and March 10, 1949. So from the Israeli prospective, the so called “War of Independence” was more offensive than defensive in nature.
- The Israelis maximally exploited the rivalry between H.M. the King Abdullah of Transjordan and al-Hajj Amin al-Husseini. For example, before the entry of any Arab armies to Palestine on May 15th, 1948, al-Hajj Amin (who resided at the time in Tyre-southern Lebanon) wanted to declare a provisional Palestinian government in the Galilee, with Safad being its capital. To preempt such a plan, H.M. the King pulled out Transjordan’s irregulars troops out of Safad on May 11th, 1948, which was the primary reason for its falling into Israeli hands few days later (Benny Morris, p. 105). Another good reason that enticed H.M. the King to collaborate with the Jewish Agency was the promise of future payments of $4 million a year for the next subsequent 5 years. (Simha Flapan, p. 138)
- Although there was an arms embargo on the warring parties in the Middle East, the embargo negatively affected the Arabs more than the Israelis. While the Arab armies were depleting their arms and ammunitions, the Israeli army was stockpiling weapons and ammunitions from a huge arms shipment from Czechoslovakia that arrived in early May, 1948.
- By October 1948, the Israeli army had 90,000 armed men, while the Arab armies had 68,000 armed men.
- It’s a fabricated myth that seven well equipped, organized, and coordinated Arab armies attempted to PUSH the poorly armed Jews into the sea, click here to read our rebuttal to this myth.
Ben-Gurion, the first Israeli Prime Minister, recognized that Palestinian nationalism created the very danger he was most afraid of. He knew that the victory in 1948 was achieved not because the Israeli Army was more heroic but because the Arab armies were corrupt and the Arab world was divided. He became obsessed with the fear that a charismatic leader would modernize Arab education, their economies, and unite all the Arab states. He wrote on November 11, 1948:
“The Arab people have been beaten by us. Will they forget it quickly? Seven hundred thousand people beat 30 million. Will they forget this offense? It can be assumed that they have a sense of honor. We will make peace efforts, but two sides are necessary for peace. Is there any security that they will not want to take revenge? Let us recognize the truth: we won not because we performed wonders, but because the Arab army is rotten. Must this rottenness persist forever? The situation in the world beckons towards revenge: there are two blocs; there is fear of world war. This tempts anyone with a grievance. We will always require a superior defensive capability.” (Simha Flapan, p. 238)
Finally, directly quoting the famous Israeli historian Avi Shlaim who stated in his famous Iron Wall book:
- “This popular-heroic-moralistic version of the 1948 war has been used extensively in Israeli propaganda and is still taught in Israeli schools. It is a prime example of the use of a nationalistic version of history in the process of nation building. In a very real sense history is the propaganda of the victors, and the history of the 1948 war is no exception.” (Iron Wall p. 34)
- “Despite all the political miscalculations and failures of those who planned the Sinai Campaign, it is their version that became firmly entrenched in the mind of the overwhelming majority of Israelis. The popular perception of the 1956 war in Israel is that it was a defensive war, a just war, a brilliantly executed war, and a war that achieved nearly all of its objectives. This version of the war was propagated not only by members of the Israeli defense establishment but by a host of sympathetic historians, journalists, and commentators. However deeply cherished, this version does not stand up to scrutiny in the light of the evidence now available. It is a striking example of the way in which history can be manipulated to serve nationalist ends. The official Israeli version of the 1956 war, like that of the 1948 war, is little more than the propaganda of the victor.” (Iron Wall, p. 185)
The Israeli virus that infected a region of 300,000,000 Arab Semites has no room for such foreign and Nazi-like criminals. It is time these “people” move back to their countries of origin (except the descendants of the original Jews who lived in Palestine prior to Zionism’s arrival) or face the erupting Arab revolutions sweeping the Arab world. There will be no mercy then.
Remember: the Jewish “good book” demands that its followers kill with NO MERCY! So, an Eye for an Eye!
And that’s probably why the Jewish teachings and prophecies expect the demise of “Israel” in the near future!